

## PART II.

### THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

God is the infinite and perfect Spirit in whom all things have their source, support, and end.

On the definition of the term God, see Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 366. Other definitions are those of Calovius: "Essentia spiritualis infinita"; Ebrard: "The eternal source of all that is temporal"; Kahnis: "The infinite Spirit"; John Howe: "An eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatsoever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection, in and of itself"; Westminster Catechism: "A Spirit infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth"; Andrew Fuller: "The first cause and last end of all things."

The existence of God is a first truth; in other words, the knowledge of God's existence is a rational intuition. Logically, it precedes and conditions all observation and reasoning. Chronologically, only reflection upon the phenomena of nature and of mind occasions its rise in consciousness.

The term intuition means simply direct knowledge. Lowndes (*Philos. of Primary Beliefs*, 78) and Mansel (*Metaphysics*, 52) would use the term only of our direct knowledge of substances, as self and body; Porter applies it by preference to our cognition of first truths, such as have been already mentioned. Harris (*Philos. Basis of Theism*, 44-151, but esp. 45, 46) makes it include both. He divides intuitions into two classes: 1. *Presentative* intuitions, as self-consciousness (in virtue of which I perceive the existence of spirit and already come in contact with the supernatural), and sense-perception (in virtue of which I perceive the existence of matter, at least in my own organism, and come in contact with nature); 2. *Rational* intuitions, as space, time, substance, cause, final cause, right, absolute being. We may accept this nomenclature, using the terms "first truths" and "rational intuitions" as equivalent to each other, and classifying rational intuitions under the heads of (1) intuitions of relations, as space and time; (2) intuitions of principles, as substance, cause, final cause, right; and (3) intuition of absolute Being, Power, Reason, Perfection, Personality, as God.

We hold that, as upon occasion of the senses cognizing (a) extended matter, (b) succession, (c) qualities, (d) change, (e) order, (f) action, respectively, the mind cognizes (a) space, (b) time, (c) substance, (d) cause, (e) design, (f) obligation, so upon occasion of our cognizing our finiteness, dependence and responsibility, the mind directly cognizes the existence of an Infinite and Absolute Authority, Perfection, Personality, upon whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible. Among those who hold to this general view of an intuitive knowledge of God may be mentioned the following:—Calvin, *Institutes*, book I., chap. 3; Nietzsche, *System of Christian Doctrine*,

15-28, 134-140; Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 78-84; Ulrich, *Leib und Seele*, 688-725; Porter, *Human Intellect*, 497; Hickok, *Rational Cosmology*, 58-89; Farrar, *Science in Theology*, 27-29; Bib. Sac., July, 1872: 553, and January, 1873: 204; Miller, *Fetich in Theology*, 110-122; Fisher, *Essays*, 565-572; Tulloch, *Theism*, 314-336; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 191-203; Christlieb, *Mod. Doubt and Christian Belief*, 75, 76; Raymond, *Syst. Theology*, 1: 247-262; Bascom, *Science of Mind*, 246, 247.

## I. FIRST TRUTHS IN GENERAL.

### 1. *Their nature.*

A. Negatively.—A first truth is not (a) Truth written prior to consciousness upon the substance of the soul—for such passive knowledge implies a materialistic view of the soul; (b) Actual knowledge of which the soul finds itself in possession at birth—for it cannot be proved that the soul has such knowledge; (c) An idea, undeveloped at birth, but which has the power of self-development apart from observation and experience—for this is contrary to all we know of the laws of mental growth.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1: 17—"Intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogitationes habemus." Origen, *Adv. Celsum*, 1: 4—"Men would not be guilty, if they did not carry in their minds common notions of morality, innate and written in divine letters." Calvin, *Institutes*, 1: 3: 3—"Those who rightly judge will always agree that there is an indelible sense of divinity engraven upon men's minds." Fleming, *Vocab. of Philosophy*, art.: "Innate Ideas"—"Descartes is supposed to have taught (and Locke devoted the first book of his *Essay* to refuting the doctrine) that these ideas are innate or connate with the soul; *i. e.*, the intellect finds itself at birth, or as soon as it wakes to conscious activity, to be possessed of ideas to which it has only to attach the appropriate names, or of judgments which it only needs to express in fit propositions—*i. e.*, prior to any experience of individual objects."

B. Positively.—A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation and reflection,—a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical priority that it must be assumed or supposed, in order to make any observation or reflection possible. Such truths are not, therefore, recognized first in order of time; some of them are assented to somewhat late in the mind's growth; by the great majority of men they are never consciously formulated at all. Yet they constitute the necessary assumptions upon which all other knowledge rests, and the mind has not only the inborn capacity to evolve them so soon as the proper occasions are presented, but the recognition of them is inevitable so soon as the mind begins to give account to itself of its own knowledge.

Mansel, *Metaphysics*, 52, 279—"To describe experience as the cause of the idea of space would be as inaccurate as to speak of the soil in which it was planted as the cause of the oak—though the planting in the soil is the condition which brings into manifestation the latent power of the acorn." Coleridge: "We see before we know that we have eyes; but when once this is known, we perceive that eyes must have pre-existed in order to enable us to see." Coleridge speaks of first truths as "those necessities of mind or forms of thinking, which, though revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience possible." McCosh, *Intuitions*, 48, 49—"Intuitions are 'like flower and fruit, which are in the plant from its embryo, but may not be actually formed till there have been a stalk and branches and leaves.'" Porter, *Human Intellect*, 501, 519—"Such truths cannot be acquired or assented to first of all." Some are reached last of all. The moral intuition is often developed late, and sometimes, even then, only upon occasion of corporal punishment. For account of the relation of the intuitions to experience, see especially Cousin, *True, Beautiful and Good*, 89-64, and *History of Philosophy*, 2: 199-245. Compare Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Introd.*, 1. See also Bascom, in *Bib. Sac.*, 23: 1-47; 27: 68-90.

2. *Their criteria.* The criteria by which first truths are to be tested are three:

A. Their universality. By this we mean, not that all men assent to them or understand them when propounded in scientific form, but that all men manifest a practical belief in them by their language, actions, and expectations.

B. Their necessity. By this we mean, not that it is impossible to deny these truths, but that the mind is compelled by its very constitution to recognize them upon the occurrence of the proper conditions, and to employ them in its arguments to prove their non-existence.

C. Their logical independence and priority. By this we mean that these truths can be resolved into no others, and proved by no others; that they are presupposed in the acquisition of all other knowledge, and can therefore be derived from no other source than an original cognitive power of the mind.

B. Instances of the professed and formal denial of first truths:—the positivist denies causality; the idealist denies substance; the pantheist denies personality; the necessitarian denies freedom; the nihilist denies his own existence. A man may in like manner argue that there is no necessity for an atmosphere; but even while he argues, he breathes it. Instance the knock-down argument to demonstrate the freedom of the will. I grant my own existence in the very doubting of it; for *cogito, ergo sum*, as Descartes himself insisted, really means *cogito, scilicet sum*; H. B. Smith: "The statement is analysis, not proof." On the criteria of first truths, see Porter, *Human Intellect*, 510, 511.

## II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD A FIRST TRUTH.

1. That *the knowledge of God's existence answers the first criterion of universality*, is evident from the following considerations:

A. It is an acknowledged fact that the vast majority of men have actually recognized the existence of a spiritual being or beings, upon whom they conceived themselves to be dependent.

The Vedas declare: "There is but one Being—no second." Max Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, 34—"Not the visible sun, moon and stars are invoked, but something else that cannot be seen." The lowest tribes have conscience, fear death, believe in witches, propitiate or frighten away evil fates. Even the fetish-worshipper, who calls the stone or the tree a god, shows that he has already the idea of a God. We must not measure the ideas of the heathen by their capacity for expression, any more than we should judge the child's belief in the existence of his father by his success in drawing the father's picture. On heathenism, its origin and nature, see Tholuck, in *Bib. Repos.*, 1832: 86; Scholz, *Götzensdienst und Zauberwesen*.

B. Those races and nations which have at first seemed destitute of such knowledge have uniformly, upon further investigation, been found to possess it, so that no tribe of men with which we have thorough acquaintance can be said to be without an object of worship. We may presume that further knowledge will show this to be true of all.

Moffat, who reported that certain African tribes were destitute of religion, was corrected by the testimony of his son-in-law, Livingstone: "The existence of God and of a future life is everywhere recognized in Africa." Where men are most nearly destitute of any formulated knowledge of God, the conditions for the awakening of the idea are most nearly absent. An apple-tree may be so conditioned that it never bears apples. "We do not judge of the oak by the stunted, flowerless specimens on the edge of the Arctic circle." On an original monotheism, see Diestel, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theol.*, 1860, and vol. 5: 669; Max Müller, *Chips*, 1: 337; Rawlinson, in *Present Day*

Tracts, no. 11; Legge, Religions of China, 8-11. *Per contra*, see Asmus, *Indogerman. Bellig.*, 2: 1-8, and synopsis, in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan., 1877: 167-172.

C. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that those individuals, in heathen or in Christian lands, who profess themselves to be without any knowledge of a spiritual power or powers above them, do yet indirectly manifest the existence of such an idea in their minds and its positive influence over them.

Herbert Spencer himself affirms the existence of a "Power to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, of which all phenomena as presented in consciousness are manifestations." The intuition of God, though formally excluded, is implicitly contained in Spencer's system, in the shape of the "irrealisable belief" in Absolute Being, which distinguishes his position from that of Comte; see Dilman, *Theistic Argument*, 58-66. Hume to Ferguson, as they walked on a starry night: "Adam, there is a God!" Voltaire prayed in an Alpine thunderstorm. Shelley, self-styled "Atheist," loved to think of a "fine intellectual spirit pervading the universe." Renan trusts in goodness, design, ends.

D. This agreement among individuals and nations so widely separated in time and place can be most satisfactorily explained by supposing that it has its ground, not in accidental circumstances, but in the nature of man as man. The diverse and imperfectly developed ideas of the supreme Being which prevail among men are best accounted for as misinterpretations and perversions of an intuitive conviction common to all.

On evidence of a universal recognition of a superior power, see Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*, 250-289, 522-533; Renouf, *Hibbert Lectures for 1879*: 100; *Bib. Sac.*, Jan., 1884: 132-157; Peschel, *Races of Men*, 281; Ulrich, *Leib und Seele*, 688, and *Gott und die Natur*, 658-670, 758; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1: 377, 381, 418; Alexander, *Evidences of Christianity*, 22; Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, 512; Liddon, *Elements of Religion*, 50; *Methodist Quar. Rev.*, Jan., 1875: 1; J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, 2: 17-21.

2. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the second criterion of necessity, will be seen by considering:

A. That men, under circumstances fitted to call forth this knowledge, cannot avoid recognizing the existence of God. In contemplating finite existence, there is inevitably suggested the idea of an infinite Being as its correlative. Upon occasion of the mind's perceiving its own finiteness, dependence, responsibility, it immediately and necessarily perceives the existence of an infinite and unconditioned Being upon whom it is dependent and to whom it is responsible.

We could not recognize the finite as finite, except by comparing it with an already existing standard—the Infinite. Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, lect. 3—"We are compelled by the constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being—a belief which appears forced upon us as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and finite." Fisher, *Journ. Chr. Philos.*, Jan., 1883: 113—"Ego and non-ego, each being conditioned by the other, presupposes unconditioned being on which both are dependent. Unconditioned being is the silent presupposition of all our knowing." Calderwood, *Philos. of Infinite*, 48, and *Moral Philos.*, 77; Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 283-285.

B. That men, in virtue of their humanity, have a capacity for religion. This recognized capacity for religion is proof that the idea of God is a necessary one. If the mind upon proper occasion did not evolve this idea, there would be nothing in man to which religion could appeal.

"It is the suggestion of the Infinite that makes the line of the far horizon, seen over land or sea, so much more impressive than the beauties of any limited landscape." In

danger men instinctively cry to God for help, and in the commands and reproaches of the moral nature the soul recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge, whose voice conscience merely echoes. O. P. Gifford: "As milk from which under proper conditions cream does not rise, is not milk, so the man who upon proper occasion shows no knowledge of God, is not man, but brute."

C. That he who denies God's existence must tacitly assume that existence in his very argument, by employing logical processes whose validity rests upon the fact of God's existence. The full proof of this belongs under the next head.

On the whole section, see A. M. Fairbairn on Origin and Development of Idea of God, in *Studies in Philos. of Relig. and History*; Martineau, *Religion and Materialism*, 45; Bp. Temple, *Bampton Lect.*, 1884: 37-65.

3. That *the knowledge of God's existence answers the third criterion of logical independence and priority*, may be shown as follows:

A. It is presupposed in all other knowledge as its logical condition and foundation. The validity of the simplest mental acts, such as sense-perception, self-consciousness, and memory, depends upon the assumption that a God exists who has so constituted our minds that they give us knowledge of things as they are.

B. The more complex processes of the mind, such as induction and deduction, can be relied on only by presupposing a thinking Deity who has made the various parts of the universe to correspond to each other and to the investigating faculties of man.

C. Our primitive belief in final cause, or, in other words, our conviction that all things have their ends, that design pervades the universe, involves a belief in God's existence. In assuming that the universe is a rational whole, a system of thought-relations, we assume the existence of an absolute Thinker, of whose thought the universe is an expression.

Peabody, *Christianity the Religion of Nature*, 23—"Induction is syllogism, with the immutable attributes of God for a constant term." Porter, *Hum. Intellect*, 492—"Induction rests upon the assumption, as it demands for its ground, that a personal or thinking Deity exists"; 658—"It has no meaning or validity unless we assume that the universe is constituted in such a way as to presuppose an absolute and unconditioned originator of its forces and laws"; 662—"We analyze the several processes of knowledge into their underlying assumptions, and we find that the assumption which underlies them all is that of a self-existent Intelligence who not only can be known by man, but must be known by man in order that man may know anything besides;" see also pages 466, 504, 506, 518, 519, 585, 616. Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 81—"The processes of reflective thought imply that the universe is grounded in, and is the manifestation of, reason"; 500—"The existence of a personal God is a necessary datum of scientific knowledge." So also, Fisher, *Essays on Supernat. Origin of Christianity*, 564, and in *Journ. Christ. Philos.*, Jan., 1883: 129, 130.

To repeat these three points in another form—the intuition of an Absolute Reason is (a) the necessary presupposition of all other knowledge, so that we cannot know anything else to exist except by assuming first of all that God exists; (b) the necessary basis of all logical thought, so that we cannot put confidence in any one of our reasoning processes except by taking for granted that a thinking Deity has constructed our minds with reference to the universe and to truth; and (c) the necessary implication of our primitive belief in design, so that we can assume all things to exist for a purpose, only by making the prior assumption that a purposing God exists—can regard the universe as a thought, only by postulating the existence of an

absolute Thinker. We cannot *prove* that God is, but we can show that, in order to the existence of any knowledge, thought, reason, in man, man must assume that God is.

Bowne, *Metaphysics*, 472—"Our objective knowledge of the finite must rest upon an ethical trust in the infinite"; 480—"Theism is the absolute postulate of all knowledge, science and philosophy"; "God is the most certain fact of objective knowledge." Ladd, *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1877: 611-616—" *Cogito, ergo Deus est*. We are obliged to postulate a not-ourselves which makes for rationality, as well as for righteousness." W. T. Harris: "Even natural science is impossible, where philosophy has not yet taught that reason made the world, and that nature is a revelation of the rational." Whately, *Logic*, 270; *New Englander*, Oct., 1871, art. on Grounds of Confidence in Inductive Reasoning; *Bib. Sac.*, 7: 415-425; Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 197; Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, ch. 'Zweck'; Ulrich, *Gott und die Natur*, 540-626; Lachelier, *Du Fondement de l'Induction*, 78. *Per contra*, see Janet, *Final Causes*, 174, note, and 457-464, who holds final cause to be, not an intuition, but the result of applying the principle of causality to cases which mechanical laws alone will not explain.

### III. OTHER SUPPOSED SOURCES OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

Our proof that the idea of God's existence is a rational intuition will not be complete, until we show that attempts to account in other ways for the origin of the idea are insufficient, and require as their presupposition the very intuition which they would supplant or reduce to a secondary place. We claim that it cannot be derived from any other source than an original cognitive power of the mind.

1. Not from external revelation,—whether communicated (*a*) through the Scriptures, or (*b*) through tradition; for, unless man had from another source a previous knowledge of the existence of a God from whom such a revelation might come, the revelation itself could have no authority for him.

(*a*) See Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, 10; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 117; H. B. Smith, *Faith and Philosophy*, 18—"A revelation takes for granted that he to whom it is made has some knowledge of God, though it may enlarge and purify that knowledge." We cannot prove God from the authority of the Scriptures, and then also prove the Scriptures from the authority of God. The very idea of Scripture as a revelation presupposes belief in a God who can make it. Newman Smyth, in *New Englander*, 1878: 365—We cannot derive from a sun-dial our knowledge of the existence of a sun. The sun-dial presupposes the sun, and cannot be understood without previous knowledge of the sun. Wutke, *Christian Ethics*, 2: 103—"The voice of the divine ego does not first come to the consciousness of the individual ego from without; rather does every external revelation presuppose already this inner one; there must echo out from within man something kindred to the outer revelation, in order to its being recognized and accepted as divine."

(*b*) Nor does our idea of God come primarily from tradition, for "tradition can perpetuate only what has already been originated" (Patton). If the knowledge thus handed down is the knowledge of a primitive revelation, then the argument just stated applies—that very revelation presupposed in those who first received it, and presupposes in those to whom it is handed down, some knowledge of a Being from whom such a revelation might come. If the knowledge thus handed down is simply knowledge of the results of the reasonings of the race, then the knowledge of God comes originally from reasoning—an explanation which we consider further on. On the traditive theory of religion, see Flint, *Theism*, 23, 338; Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, 86-96; Fairbairn, *Studies in Philos. of Relig. and Hist.*, 14, 15; Bowen, *Metaph. and Ethics*, 453, and in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1876; Pfeiderer, *Religionsphilos.*, 312-322.

2. Not from experience,—whether this mean (*a*) the sense-perception and reflection of the individual (Locke), (*b*) the accumulated results of the sensations and associations of past generations of the race (Herbert Spencer),

or (c) the actual contact of our sensitive nature with God, the supersensible reality, through the religious feeling (Newman Smyth).

The first form of this theory is inconsistent with the fact that the idea of God is not the idea of a sensible or material object, nor a combination of such ideas. Since the spiritual and infinite are direct opposites of the material and finite, no experience of the latter can account for our idea of the former.

With Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understanding*, 2: 1: 4), experience is the passive reception of ideas by sensation or by reflection. Locke's *tabula rasa* theory mistakes the occasion of our primitive ideas for their cause. To his statement: "Nihil est in intellectu nisi quod ante fuerit in sensu," Leibnitz replied: "Nisi intellectus ipse." . . . Consciousness is sometimes called the source of our knowledge of God. But consciousness, as simply an accompanying knowledge of ourselves and our states, is not properly the source of any other knowledge. The German *Gottesbewusstsein* = not 'consciousness of God,' but 'knowledge of God'; *Bewusstsein* here = not a 'con-knowing,' but a 'be-knowing'; see Porter, *Human Intellect*, 86; Cousin, *True, Beautiful and Good*, 48, 49.

The second form of the theory is open to the objection that the very first experience of the first man, equally with man's latest experience, presupposes this intuition, as well as the other intuitions, and therefore cannot be the cause of it. Moreover, even though this theory of its origin were correct, it would still be impossible to think of the object of the intuition as not existing, and the intuition would still represent to us the highest measure of certitude at present attainable by man. If the evolution of ideas is toward truth instead of falsehood, it is the part of wisdom to act upon the hypothesis that our primitive belief is veracious.

See Bowne, *Examination of Spencer*, 163, 164—"Are we to seek truth in the minds of pre-human apes, or in the blind stirrings of some primitive pulp? In that case we can indeed put away all our science, but we must put away the great doctrine of evolution along with it. The experience-philosophy cannot escape this alternative: either the positive deliverances of our mature consciousness must be accepted as they stand, or all truth must be declared impossible." See also Harris, *Philos. Basis Theism*, 137-142.

The third form of the theory seems to make God a sensuous object, to reverse the proper order of knowing and feeling, to ignore the fact that in all feeling there is at least some knowledge of an object, and to forget that the validity of this very feeling can be maintained only by previously assuming the existence of a rational Deity.

Newman Smyth tells us that feeling comes first; the idea is secondary. Intuitive ideas are not denied, but they are declared to be direct reflections, in thought, of the feelings. They are the mind's immediate perception of what it feels to exist. Direct knowledge of God by intuition is considered to be idealistic; reaching God by inference is regarded as rationalistic, in its tendency. See Smyth, *The Religious Feeling*; reviewed by Harris, in *New Englander*, Jan., 1878; reply by Smyth, in *New Englander* May, 1878.

### 3. Not from reasoning,—because

(a) The actual rise of this knowledge in the great majority of minds is not the result of any conscious process of reasoning. On the other hand, upon occurrence of the proper conditions, it flashes upon the soul with the quickness and force of an immediate revelation.

(b) The strength of men's faith in God's existence is not proportioned to the strength of the reasoning faculty. On the other hand, men of greatest

logical power are often inveterate sceptics, while men of unwavering faith are found among those who cannot even understand the arguments for God's existence.

(c) There is more in this knowledge than reasoning could ever have furnished. Men do not limit their belief in God to the just conclusions of argument. The arguments for the divine existence, valuable as they are for purposes to be shown hereafter, are not sufficient by themselves to warrant our conviction that there exists an infinite and absolute Being. It will appear upon examination that the *a priori* argument is capable of proving only an abstract and ideal proposition, but can never conduct us to the existence of a real Being. It will appear that the *a posteriori* arguments, from merely finite existence, can never demonstrate the existence of the infinite. In the words of Sir Wm. Hamilton (Discussions, 23)—“A demonstration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd, as in such a syllogism we must collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises”—in short, from finite premises we cannot draw an infinite conclusion.

Whately, *Logic*, 290-292; Jevons, *Lessons in Logic*, 81; Thompson, *Outline Laws of Thought*, sections 82-92; Calderwood, *Philos. of Infinite*, 60-69, and *Moral Philosophy*, 238; Turnbull, in *Bap. Quarterly*, July, 1872: 271; Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 239; Dove, *Logic of Christian Faith*, 21. Sir Wm. Hamilton: “Departing from the particular, we admit that we cannot, in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite.”

(d) Neither do men arrive at the knowledge of God's existence by inference; for inference is condensed syllogism, and, as a form of reasoning, is equally open to the objection just mentioned. We have seen, moreover, that all logical processes are based upon the assumption of God's existence. Evidently that which is presupposed in all reasoning cannot itself be proved by reasoning.

By inference, we of course mean mediate inference, for in immediate inference (*c. g.* “All good rulers are just; therefore no unjust rulers are good”) there is no reasoning, and no progress in thought. Mediate inference is reasoning—is condensed syllogism; and what is so condensed may be expanded into regular logical form. Deductive inference: “A negro is a fellow-creature; therefore he who strikes a negro strikes a fellow-creature.” Inductive inference: “The first finger is before the second; therefore it is before the third.” On inference, see Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 105-108; Porter, *Human Intellect*, 444-448; Jevons, *Principles of Science*, 1: 14, 136-139, 168, 262.

Flint, in his *Theism*, 77, and Herbert, in his *Mod. Realism Examined*, would reach the knowledge of God's existence by inference. The latter says God is not demonstrable, but his existence is inferred, like the existence of our fellow men. But we reply that in this last case we infer only the finite from the finite, while the difficulty in the case of God is in inferring the infinite from the finite. This very process of reasoning, moreover, presupposes the existence of God as the absolute Reason, in the way already indicated.

Substantially the same error is committed by H. B. Smith, *Introd. to Chr. Theol.*, 84-133, and by Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 316, 364, both of whom grant an intuitive element, but use it only to eke out the insufficiency of reasoning. They consider that the intuition gives us only an abstract idea, which contains in itself no voucher for the existence of an actual being corresponding to the idea, and that we reach real being only by inference from the facts of our own spiritual natures and of the outward world. But we reply, in the words of McCosh, that “the intuitions are primarily directed to individual objects.” We know, not the infinite in the abstract, but infinite space and time, and the infinite God. See McCosh, *Intuitions*, 26, 109, who, however, holds the view here combated.



## IV. CONTENTS OF THIS INTUITION.

1. In this fundamental knowledge *that* God is, it is necessarily implied that to some extent men know intuitively *what* God is, namely, (a) a Reason in which their mental processes are grounded; (b) a Power above them upon which they are dependent; (c) a Perfection which imposes law upon their moral natures; (d) a Personality which they may recognize in prayer and worship.

In maintaining that we have a rational intuition of God, we by no means imply that a presentative intuition of God is impossible. Such a presentative intuition was perhaps characteristic of unfallen man; it does belong at times to the Christian; it will be the blessing of heaven (Mat. 5: 8—"the pure in heart . . . shall see God;" Rev. 22: 4—"they shall see his face"). Men's experiences of face-to-face apprehension of God, in danger and guilt, give some reason to believe that a presentative knowledge of God is the normal condition of humanity. But as this presentative intuition of God is not in our present state universal, we here claim only that all men have a rational intuition of God.

It is to be remembered, however, that the loss of love to God has greatly obscured even this rational intuition, so that the revelation of nature and the Scriptures is needed to awaken, confirm, and enlarge it, and the special work of the Spirit of Christ to make it the knowledge of friendship and communion. Thus, from knowing about God, we come to know God (John 17: 3—"This is life eternal, that they should know thee;" 2 Tim. 1: 12—"I know him whom I have believed").

Harris, *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, 208—"By rational intuition man knows that absolute Being *exists*; his knowledge of *what* it is, is progressive with his progressive knowledge of man and of nature." Hutton, *Essays*: "A haunting presence besets man behind and before. He cannot evade it. It gives new meanings to his thoughts, new terror to his sins. It becomes intolerable. He is moved to set up some idol, carved out of his own nature, that will take its place—a non-moral God who will not disturb his dream of rest. It is a righteous Life and Will, and not the mere *idea* of righteousness that stirs men so." Porter, *Hum. Int.*, 661—"The Absolute is a thinking Agent." The intuition does not grow in certainty; what grows is the mind's quickness in applying it and power of expressing it. The intuition is not complex; what is complex is the Being intuitively cognized. See Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 232; Lowndes, *Philos. of Primary Beliefs*, 108-112; Luthardt, *Fund. Truths*, 157; Latent faculty of speech called forth by speech of others; choked-up well flows again when debris is cleared away. Bowen, in *Bib. Sac.*, 33: 740-764; Bowne, *Theism*, 79.

2. The Scriptures, therefore, do not attempt to prove the existence of God, but, on the other hand, both assume and declare that the knowledge that God is, is universal (Rom. 1: 19-21, 28, 32; 2: 15). God has inlaid the evidence of this fundamental truth in the very nature of man, so that nowhere is he without a witness. The preacher may confidently follow the example of Scripture by assuming it. But he must also explicitly declare it, as the Scripture does. "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen" (*καθ' ὁράται*—spiritually viewed); the organ given for this purpose is the *νοῦς* (*νοούμενα*); but then—and this forms the transition to our next division of the subject—they are "perceived through the things that are made" (*τοῖς ποιήμασιν*, Rom. 1: 20).

On Rom. 1: 19-21, see Weiss, *Bib. Theol. des N. T.*, 251, note; also Commentaries of Meyer

Alford, Tholuck, and Wordsworth; τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ = not "that which may be known" (Rev. Vers.) but "that which is known" of God; νοούμενα καθοράται = are clearly seen in that they are perceived by the reason — νοούμενα expresses the manner of the καθοράται (Meyer): compare John 1: 9; Acts 17: 27; Rom. 1: 28; 2: 15. On 1 Cor. 15: 34, see Calderwood, *Philos. of Inf.*, 486—ἀγνωσίαν Θεοῦ τινὲς ἔχουσι = do not possess the specially exalted knowledge of God which belongs to believers in Christ (*cf.* 1 Jo. 4: 7—"every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God"). On Eph. 2: 12, see Pope, *Theology*, 1: 240—ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ is opposed to being in Christ, and signifies rather forsaken of God, than denying him or entirely ignorant of him. On Scripture passages, see Schmid, *Bib. Theol. des N. T.*, 486; Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1: 62.

On the general subject of intuition as connected with our idea of God, see Ladd, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1877: 1-36, 611-616; 1878: 619; *Journal of Christ. Philos.*, Jan., 1883: 113-134 (Final cause an intuition—by Fisher), and Apr., 1883: 283-307 (Genesis of Idea of God—by Patton); McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism*, 124-140; Mansel, *Metaphysics*, in *Encyc. Britan.*, 8th ed., 14: 604 *sq.*, and 615 *sq.*; Robert Hall, *Sermon on Atheism*; Hutton on *Atheism*, in *Essays*, 1: 3-37; Shairp, in *Princeton Rev.*, Mar., 1881: 264.

## CHAPTER II.

### CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

Although the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be explicated and confirmed by arguments drawn from the actual universe and from the abstract ideas of the human mind.

**Remark 1.** These arguments are probable, not demonstrative. For this reason they supplement each other, and constitute a series of evidences which is cumulative in its nature. Though, taken singly, none of them can be considered absolutely decisive, they together furnish a corroboration of our primitive conviction of God's existence, which is of great practical value, and is in itself sufficient to bind the moral action of men.

Butler, *Analogy*, Introd., Bohn's ed., 72: Probable evidence admits of degrees, from the highest moral certainty to the lowest presumption. Yet probability is the guide of life. In matters of morals and religion, we are not to expect mathematical or demonstrative, but only probable, evidence, and the slightest preponderance of such evidence may be sufficient to bind our moral action. Dove, *Logic of Christ. Faith*, 24: Value of the arguments taken together is much greater than that of any single one. Illustrated from water, air and food, together but not separately, supporting life; value of £1000 note, not in paper, stamp, writing, signature, taken separately. A whole bundle of rods cannot be broken, though each rod in the bundle may be broken separately. The strength of the bundle is the strength of the whole. Lord Bacon, *Essay on Atheism*: "A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further, but, when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 221-223—"The proof of a God and of a spiritual world which is to satisfy us must consist in a number of different but converging lines of proof."

**Remark 2.** A consideration of these arguments may also serve to explicate the contents of an intuition which has remained obscure and only half conscious for lack of reflection. The arguments, indeed, are the efforts of the mind that already has a conviction of God's existence to give to itself a formal account of its belief. An exact estimate of their logical value and of their relation to the intuition which they seek to express in syllogistic form, is essential to any proper refutation of the prevalent atheistic and pantheistic reasoning.

Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 263—"Nor have I claimed that the existence, even, of this Being can be demonstrated as we demonstrate the abstract truths of science. I have only claimed that the universe, as a great fact, demands a rational explanation, and that the most rational explanation that can possibly be given is that furnished in the conception of such a Being. In this conclusion reason rests, and refuses to rest in any other." Rückert: "Wer Gott nicht fühlt in sich und allen Lebenskreisen, Dem werdet ihr nicht ihn beweisen mit Beweisen." Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 307—"Theology depends on noetic and empirical science to give the occasion on which the idea of the Absolute Being arises, and to give content to the idea." Andrew Fuller,

Part of Syst. of Divin., 4: 283, questions "whether argumentation in favor of the existence of God has not made more sceptics than believers." So far as this is true, it is due to an overstatement of the arguments and an exaggerated notion of what is to be expected from them. See Nitzsch, *Christian Doctrine*, translation, 140; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 119, 120; Fisher, *Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 572, 573; Van Oosterzee, 238, 241.

Remark 3. The arguments for the divine existence may be reduced to four, namely: I. The Cosmological; II. The Teleological; III. The Anthropological; and IV. The Ontological. We shall examine these in order, seeking first to determine the precise conclusions to which they respectively lead, and then to ascertain in what manner the four may be combined.

#### I. THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR ARGUMENT FROM CHANGE IN NATURE.

This is not properly an argument from effect to cause; for the proposition that every effect must have a cause is simply identical, and means only that every caused event must have a cause. It is rather an argument from begun existence to a sufficient cause of that beginning, and may be accurately stated as follows:

Everything begun, whether substance or phenomenon, owes its existence to some producing cause. The universe, at least so far as its present form is concerned, is a thing begun, and owes its existence to a cause which is equal to its production. This cause must be indefinitely great.

It is to be noticed that this argument moves wholly in the realm of nature. The argument from man's constitution and beginning upon the planet is treated under another head (see Anthropological Argument). That the present form of the universe is not eternal in the past, but has begun to be, not only personal observation but the testimony of geology assures us. For statements of the argument, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Bohn's transl.), 370; Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, 3: 34-44; Bib. Sac., 1849: 613; 1850: 613; Porter, *Hum. Intellect*, 570; Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, 98. It has often been claimed, as by Locke, Clarke, and Robert Hall, that this argument is sufficient to conduct the mind to an Eternal and Infinite First Cause. We proceed therefore to mention

##### 1. *The defects of the Cosmological Argument.*

A. It is impossible to show that the universe, so far as its substance is concerned, has had a beginning. The law of causality declares, not that everything has a cause—for then God himself must have a cause—but rather that everything begun has a cause, or, in other words, that every event or change has a cause.

Hume, *Philos. Works*, 2: 411 *sq.*, urges with reason that we never saw a world made. Many philosophers in Christian lands, as Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 206, and the prevailing opinion of ante-Christian times, have held matter to be eternal. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, 107—"For being itself, the reflective reason never asks a cause, unless the being show signs of dependence. It is change that first gives rise to the demand for cause." See also McCosh, *Intuitions*, 225-241; Calderwood, *Philos. of Infinite*, 61. *Per contra*, see Murphy, *Scient. Bases of Faith*, 49, 196, and *Habit and Intelligence*, 1: 55-67; Knight, *Lect. on Metaphysics*, lect. II, p. 19.

B. Granting that the universe, so far as its phenomena are concerned, has had a cause, it is impossible to show that any other cause is required than a cause within itself, such as the pantheist supposes.

Flint, *Theism*, 65—"The cosmological argument alone proves only force, and no mere

force is God. Intelligence must go with power to make a Being that can be called God." Diman, *Theistic Argument*—"The cosmological argument alone cannot decide whether the force that causes change is permanent self-existent mind, or permanent self-existent matter." Only intelligence gives the basis for an answer. Only mind in the universe enables us to infer mind in the maker. But the argument from intelligence is not the Cosmological, but the Teleological, and to this last belong all proofs of Deity from order and combination in nature.

C. Granting that the universe must have had a cause outside of itself, it is impossible to show that this cause has not itself been caused, *i. e.*, consists of an infinite series of dependent causes. The principle of causality does not require that everything begun should be traced back to an uncaused cause; it demands that we should assign a cause, but not that we should assign a first cause.

So with the whole series of causes. The materialist is bound to find a cause for this series, only when the series is shown to have had a beginning. But the very hypothesis of an infinite series of causes excludes the idea of such a beginning. An infinite chain has no topmost link (*versus* Robert Hall); an uncaused and eternal succession does not need a cause (*versus* Clarke and Locke). See Whately, *Logic*, 270; *New Englander*, Jan., 1874: 75; Alexander, *Moral Science*, 221; Pfleiderer, *Die Religion*, 1: 160-164; Calderwood, *Moral Philos.*, 225; Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, 37—criticised by Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 36. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 128, says that the causal principle is not satisfied till by regress we come to a cause which is not itself an effect—to one who is *causa sui*: *Aids to Study of German Theology*, 15-17: Even if the universe be eternal, its contingent and relative nature requires us to postulate an eternal Creator; Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 86—"While the law of causation does not lead logically up to the conclusion of a first cause, it compels us to affirm it." We reply that it is not the law of causation which compels us to affirm it, for this certainly "does not lead logically up to the conclusion." If we infer an uncaused cause, we do it, not by logical process, but by virtue of the intuitive belief within us. So substantially Secretan, and Whewell, in *Indications of a Creator*, and in *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, 2: 321, 322—"The mind takes refuge, in the assumption of a First Cause, from an employment inconsistent with its own nature"; "we necessarily infer a First Cause, although the paleontological sciences only point towards it, but do not lead us to it."

D. Granting that the cause of the universe has not itself been caused, it is impossible to show that this cause is not finite, like the universe itself. The causal principle requires a cause no greater than just sufficient to account for the effect.

We cannot therefore infer an infinite cause, unless the universe is infinite—which cannot be proved, but can only be assumed—and this is assuming an infinite in order to prove an infinite. All we know of the universe is finite. An infinite universe implies infinite number. But no number can be infinite, for to any number, however great, a unit can be added, which shows that it was not infinite before. Here again we see that the most approved forms of the Cosmological Argument are obliged to avail themselves of the intuition of the infinite, to supplement the logical process. On the law of *parimony*, see Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Discussions*, 23.

2. *The value of the Cosmological Argument*, then, is simply this,—it proves the existence of some cause of the universe indefinitely great. When we go beyond this, and ask whether this cause is a cause of being, or merely a cause of change, to the universe; whether it is a cause apart from the universe, or one with it; whether it is an eternal cause, or a cause dependent upon some other cause; whether it is intelligent or unintelligent, infinite or finite, one or many,—this argument cannot assure us.

On the whole argument, see Flint, *Theism*, 96-130; Mozley, *Essays, Hist. and Theol.*, 2: 414-444; Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, 148-154; *Studien und Kritiken*, 1876: 9-31.

## II. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR ARGUMENT FROM ORDER AND USEFUL COLLOCATION IN NATURE.

This is not properly an argument from design to a designer; for that design implies a designer is simply an identical proposition. It may be more correctly stated as follows: Order and useful collocation pervading a system respectively imply intelligence and purpose as the cause of that order and collocation. Since order and useful collocation pervade the universe, there must exist an intelligence adequate to the production of this order, and a will adequate to direct this collocation to useful ends.

Etymologically, "teleological argument" = argument to ends or final causes, that is, "causes which, beginning as a thought, work themselves out into a fact as an end or result" (Porter, *Hum. Intellect*, 592-618). This definition of the argument would be broad enough to cover the proof of a designing intelligence drawn from the constitution of man. This last, however, is treated as a part of the Anthropological Argument, which follows this, and the Teleological Argument covers only the proof of a designing intelligence drawn from nature. Hence Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bohn's trans., 381, calls it the physico-theological argument. On methods of stating the argument, see *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1867: 625. See also Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, 155-185; Mozley, *Essays Hist. and Theol.*, 2: 365-413.

Hicks, in his *Critique of Design-arguments*, 347-389, makes two arguments instead of one: (1) the argument from *order* to *intelligence*, to which he gives the name Eutaxiological; (2) the argument from *adaptation* to *purpose*, to which he would restrict the name Teleological. He holds that Teleology proper cannot prove *intelligence*, because in speaking of "ends" at all, it must assume the very intelligence which it seeks to prove; that it actually does prove simply the *intentional exercise* of an intelligence whose existence has been previously established. "Circumstances, forces or agencies converging to a definite rational result imply volition—imply that this result is intended—is an end. This is the major premise of the new teleology." He objects to the term "final cause." The end is not a cause at all—it is a motive. The characteristic element of cause is power to produce an effect. Ends have no such power. The will may choose them or set them aside. As already assuming intelligence, ends cannot prove intelligence.

With this in the main we agree, and count it a valuable help to the statement and understanding of the argument. In the very observation of *order*, however, as well as in arguing from it, we are obliged to assume the same all-arranging intelligence. We see no objection therefore to making Eutaxiology the first part of the Teleological Argument, as we do above. See review of Hicks, in *Meth. Quar. Rev.*, July, 1883: 569-576. We proceed however to certain

### 1. *Further explanations.*

A. The major premise expresses a primitive conviction. It is not invalidated by the objections: (a) that order and useful collocation may exist without being purposed—for we are compelled by our very mental constitution to deny this in all cases where the order and collocation pervade a system; (b) that order and useful collocation may result from the mere operation of physical forces and laws—for these very forces and laws imply, instead of excluding, an originating and superintending intelligence and will.

Janet, in his work on Final Causes, 8, denies that finality is a primitive conviction, like causality, and calls it the result of an induction. He therefore proceeds from (1) marks of order and useful collocation to (2) finality in nature, and then to (3) an intelligent cause of this finality or "pre-conformity to future event." So Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 105, claims simply that, as change requires cause, so orderly change requires intelligent cause. We have shown, however, that induction and argument of every kind presupposes intuitive belief in final cause. Nature does not give us final cause; but no more does she give us efficient cause. Mind gives us both, and gives them as clearly upon one experience as after a thousand.

(a) Illustration of unpurposed order, in the single throwing of "double sixes"—constant throwing of double sixes indicates design. So arrangement of detritus at mouth of river. See Chauncey Wright, in *N. Y. Nation*, Jan. 15, 1874; Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 208.

(b) Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 231-247—"Law is method, not cause. A man cannot offer the very fact to be explained, as its sufficient explanation." Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 144—"Patterned damask made not by the weaver but by the loom?" Joseph Cook: "Books written by the laws of spelling and grammar?" Dr. Stevenson: "House requires no architect because it is built by stonemasons and carpenters?" Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 274, 275, 307—"The teleological and the mechanical views of the universe are not mutually exclusive." Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Metaphysics*: "Intelligence stands first in the order of existence. Efficient causes are preceded by final causes." See also Thornton, *Old Fashioned Ethics*, 199-235. Evolution has to do with the *how*, not with the *why*, of phenomena, and therefore is not inconsistent with design, but rather is a new and higher illustration of design. Frances Power Cobbe: "It is a singular fact that, whenever we find out *how* a thing is done, our first conclusion seems to be that God did not do it." Bp. Temple, *Bampton Lect.*, 1884: 99-123; Owen, *Anat. of Vertebrates*, 3: 796; Pierce, *Ideality in the Physical Sciences*, 1-35.

B. The minor premise expresses a working-principle of all science, namely, that all things have their uses, that order pervades the universe, and that the methods of nature are rational methods. Evidences of this appear in the correlation of the chemical elements to each other; in the fitness of the inanimate world to be the basis and support of life; in the typical forms and unity of plan apparent in the organic creation; in the existence and coöperation of natural laws; in cosmical order and compensations.

This minor premise is not invalidated by the objections: (a) That we frequently misunderstand the end actually subserved by natural events and objects; for the principle is, not that we necessarily know the actual end, but that we necessarily believe that there is some end, in every case of systematic order and collocation. (b) That the order of the universe is manifestly imperfect; for this, if granted, would argue, not absence of contrivance, but some special reason for imperfection, either in the limitations of the contriving intelligence itself, or in the nature of the end sought (as, for example, correspondence with the moral state and probation of sinners).

Diman, *Theistic Argument*: "Not only do we observe in the world the change which is the basis of the Cosmological Argument, but we perceive that this change proceeds according to a fixed and invariable rule. In inorganic nature, general order, or *regularity*; in organic nature, special order, or *adaptation*." Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 113-115, 224-230: "Inductive science proceeds upon the postulate that the reasonable and the natural are one." This furnished the guiding clue to Harvey and Cuvier; see Whewell, *Hist. Induct. Sciences*, 2: 489-491. Kant: "The anatomist must assume that nothing in man is in vain." On molecules as manufactured articles, see Cooke, *Religion and Chemistry*, and New Chemistry, lect. 1; also, Maxwell, in *Nature*, Sept. 25, 1873. See also Tulloch, *Theism*, 116, 120; LeConte, *Religion and Science*, lect. 2 and 3; McCosh, *Typical Forms*, 81, 420; Agassiz, *Essay on Classification*, 9, 10; *Bib. Sac.*, 1849: 634, and 1850: 613; Hopkins, in *Princeton Review*, Sept., 1882: 181.

(a) Design, in fact that rivers always run by large towns? that springs are always found at gambling places? Plants made for man, and man for worms? Voltaire: "Noses are made for spectacles—let us wear them!" Pope: "While man exclaims 'See all things for my use,' 'See man for mine' replies the pampered goose." Many of the objections to design arise from mistaking a part of the creation for the whole, or a structure in process of development for a structure completed. For illustration of mistaken ends, see Janet, *Final Causes*.

(b) Alphonso of Castile took offense at the Ptolemaic system. See John Stuart Mill's indictment of nature, in his posthumous *Essays on Religion*. So also Schopenhauer

and von Hartmann. *Per contra*, see Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 264, 265; McCosh, Christianity and Positivism, 82 *sq.*; Martineau, Essays, 1: 50; Porter, Human Intellect, 599; Mivart, Lessons from Nature, 366-371; Princeton Review, Mar., 1878: 272-303; Shaw on Positivism.

2. *Defects of the Teleological Argument.* These attach not to the premises but to the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom.

A. The argument cannot prove a personal God. The order and useful collocations of the universe may be only the changing phenomena of an impersonal intelligence and will, such as pantheism supposes. The finality may be only immanent finality.

There is such a thing as immanent and unconscious finality. National spirit, without set purpose, constructs language. The bee works unconsciously to ends. Strato of Lampsacus regarded the world as a vast animal. Hopkins, *Miscellanies*, 18-36—"So long as there is such a thing as impersonal and adapting intelligence in the brute creation, we cannot necessarily infer from unchanging laws a free and personal God." See Fisher, *Supernat. Origin of Christianity*, 576-578. Kant shows that the argument does not prove an intelligence apart from the world (*Critique*, 370). We must bring mind to the world, if we would find mind in it. Leave out man, and nature cannot be properly interpreted; the intelligence and will in nature may still be unconscious. But, taking in man, we are bound to get our idea of the intelligence and will in nature from the highest type of intelligence and will we know, and that is man's. Nullus in microcossmo spiritus, nullus in macrocossmo Deus. "We receive but what we give, And in our life alone does Nature live."

The Teleological Argument therefore needs to be supplemented by the Anthropological Argument, or the argument from the mental and moral constitution of man. By itself, it does not prove a Creator. See Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 26; Ritter, *Hist. Anc. Philos.*, bk. 9, chap. 6; *Foundations of our Faith*, 38; Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 215; *Habit and Intelligence*, 2: 6, and chap. 27. On immanent finality, see Janet, *Final Causes*, 345-415; Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 201-203. Since righteousness belongs only to personality, this argument cannot prove righteousness in God. Flint, *Theism*, 66—"Power and intelligence alone do not constitute God, though they be infinite. A being may have these, and, if lacking righteousness, may be a devil." Here again we see the need of the Anthropological Argument to supplement this.

B. Even if this argument could prove personality in the intelligence and will that originated the order of the universe, it could not prove either the unity, the eternity, or the infinity of God; not the unity—for the useful collocations of the universe might be the result of oneness of counsel, instead of oneness of essence, in the contriving intelligence; not the eternity—for a created demiurge might conceivably have designed the universe; not the infinity—since all marks of order and collocation within our observation are simply finite.

Diman asserts (*Theistic Argument*, 114) that all the phenomena of the universe must be due to the same source—since all alike are subject to the same method of sequence, *e. g.* gravitation—and that the evidence points us irresistibly to some *one* explanatory cause. We can regard this assertion only as the utterance of a primitive belief in a first cause, not as the conclusion of logical demonstration, for we know only an infinitesimal part of the universe. From the point of view of the intuition of an Absolute Reason, however, we can cordially assent to the words of F. L. Patton: "When we consider Matthew Arnold's 'stream of tendency,' Spencer's 'unknowable,' Schopenhauer's 'world as will,' and Hartmann's elaborate defence of finality as the product of unconscious intelligence, we may well ask if the theists, with their belief in one personal God, are not in possession of the only hypothesis that can save the language of these writers from the charge of meaningless and idiotic raving" (*Journ. Christ. Philos.*, April, 1883: 283-307).

3. *The value of the Teleological Argument* is simply this,—it proves from certain useful collocations and instances of order which have clearly



had a beginning, or in other words, from the present harmony of the universe, that there exists an intelligence and will adequate to its contrivance. But whether this intelligence and will is personal or impersonal, creator or only fashioner, one or many, finite or infinite, eternal or owing its being to another, necessary or free, this argument cannot assure us.

In it, however, we take a step forward. The causative power which we have proved by the Cosmological Argument has now become an intelligent and voluntary power.

John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays on Theism*, 168-170—"In the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of causation by intelligence." On the whole argument, see Bib. Sac., 1849: 634; Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 216; Flint, *Theism*, 131-210; Pfeiderer, *Die Religion*, 1: 164-174.

### III. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR ARGUMENT FROM MAN'S MENTAL AND MORAL NATURE.

This is an argument from the mental and moral constitution of man to the existence of an Author, Lawgiver, and End. It is sometimes called the Moral Argument.

The common title "Moral Argument" is much too narrow, for it seems to take account only of conscience in man, whereas the argument which this title so imperfectly designates really proceeds from man's intellectual and emotional, as well as from his moral, nature. In choosing the designation we have adopted, we desire, moreover, to rescue from the mere physicist the term "Anthropology"—a term to which he has attached altogether too limited a signification, and which, in his use of it, implies that man is a mere animal. Anthropology means, not simply the science of man's physical nature, origin, and relations, but also the science which treats of his higher spiritual being. Hence, in Theology, the term Anthropology designates that division of the subject which treats of man's spiritual nature and endowments, his original state and his subsequent apostasy. As an argument, therefore, from man's mental and moral nature, we can with perfect propriety call the present argument the Anthropological Argument.

The argument is a complex one, and may be divided into three parts.

1. Man's intellectual and moral nature must have had for its author an intellectual and moral Being. The elements of the proof are as follows:—  
(a) Man, as an intellectual and moral Being, has had a beginning upon the planet. (b) Material and unconscious forces do not afford a sufficient cause for man's reason, conscience, and free will. (c) Man, as an effect, can be referred only to a cause possessing self-consciousness and a moral nature, in other words, personality.

This argument is in part an application to man of the principles of both the Cosmological and the Teleological Arguments. Flint, *Theism*, 74—"Although causality does not involve design, nor design goodness, yet design involves causality, and goodness both causality and design." Jacobi: "Nature conceals God; man reveals him."

Man is an effect. The history of the geologic ages proves that man has not always existed, and even if the lower creatures were his progenitors, his intellect and freedom are not eternal *a parte ante*. We consider man, not as a physical, but as a spiritual, being. Thompson, *Christian Theism*, 75—"Every true cause must be sufficient to account for the effect." Locke, *Essay*, book 4, chap. 10—"Cogitable existence cannot be produced out of incogitable."

Personality = self-consciousness - self-determination in view of moral ends. The brute has intelligence and will, but has neither self-consciousness, conscience, nor free-will. See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 76 sq. Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 91, 251—"Suppose 'the intuitions of the moral faculty are the slowly organized results of experience received from the race'; still, having found that the universe affords evidence of a supremely intelligent cause, we may believe that man's moral nature affords the

highest illustration of its mode of working"; 358: "Shall we explain the lower forms of will by the higher, or the higher by the lower?"

2. Man's moral nature proves the existence of a holy Lawgiver and Judge. The elements of the proof are:—(a) Conscience recognizes the existence of a moral law which has supreme authority. (b) Known violations of this moral law are followed by feelings of ill-desert and fears of judgment. (c) This moral law, since it is not self-imposed, and these threats of judgment, since they are not self-executing, respectively argue the existence of a holy will that has imposed the law, and of a punitive power that will execute the threats of the moral nature.

See Bishop Butler's Sermons on Human Nature, in Works, Bohn's ed., 385-414. Butler's great discovery was that of the supremacy of conscience in the moral constitution of man: "Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." Conscience = the moral judiciary of the soul—not law, nor sheriff, but judge; see under Anthropology. Dimsan, *Theistic Argument*, 251—"Conscience does not lay down a law; it warns us of the existence of a law; and not only of a law, but of a purpose—not our own, but the purpose of another, which it is our mission to realize." See Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 218 sq. It proves personality in the Lawgiver, because its utterances are not abstract, like those of reason, but are in the nature of command; they are not in the indicative, but in the imperative, mood; it says, "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not." This argues *will*.

Hutton, *Essays*, 1: 11—"Conscience is an ideal Moses, and thunders from an invisible Sinai;" "the Atheist regards conscience not as a skylight, opened to let in upon human nature an infinite dawn from above, but as a polished arch or dome, completing and reflecting the whole edifice beneath." But conscience cannot be the mere reflection and expression of nature, for it represses and condemns nature. Tulloch, *Theism*: "Conscience, like the magnetic needle, indicates the existence of an unknown Power which from afar controls its vibrations and at whose presence it trembles." Nero spends nights of terror in wandering through the halls of his Golden House. Kant holds that faith in duty requires faith in a God who will defend and reward duty—see *Critique of Pure Reason*, 356-387. See also Porter, *Human Intellect*, 524.

3. Man's emotional and voluntary nature proves the existence of a Being who can furnish in himself a satisfying object of human affection and an end which will call forth man's highest activities and ensure his highest progress.

Only a Being of power, wisdom, holiness, and goodness, and all these indefinitely greater than any that we know upon the earth, can meet this demand of the human soul. Such a Being must exist. Otherwise man's greatest need would be unsupplied, and belief in a lie be more productive of virtue than belief in the truth.

Feuerbach calls God "the Brocken-shadow of man himself;" "consciousness of God = self-consciousness;" "religion is a dream of the human soul;" "all theology is anthropology." But conscience shows that man does not recognize in God simply his like, but also his opposite. Not as Galton: "Piety = conscience + instability." The finest minds are of the leaning type; see Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 370; Augustine, *Confessions*, 1: 1—"Thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless till it find rest in thee." On John Stuart Mill—"a mind that could not find God, and a heart that could not do without him"—see his *Autobiography*, and Browne, in *Strivings for the Faith* (Christ. Ev. Soc'y), 259-287. Comte, in his later days, constructed an object of worship in Universal Humanity, and invented a ritual which Huxley calls "Catholicism minus Christianity." See also Tyndall, *Belfast Address*: "Did I not believe, said a great man to me once, that an Intelligence exists at the heart of things, my life on earth would be intolerable."

We must freely grant, however, that this argument from man's aspirations has weight only upon the supposition that a wise, truthful, holy, and benevolent God exists, who has so constituted our minds that their thinking and their affections correspond to

truth and to himself. An evil being might have so constituted us that all logic would lead us into error. The argument is therefore the development and expression of our intuitive idea of God. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*: "Nature is like a written document containing only consonants. It is we who must furnish the vowels that shall decipher it. Unless we bring with us the idea of God, we shall find nature but dumb." See also Pfeiderer, *Die Religion*, 1: 174.

A. *The defects of the Anthropological Argument are:* (a) It cannot prove a creator of the material universe. (b) It cannot prove the infinity of God, since man from whom we argue is finite. (c) It cannot prove the mercy of God. But,

B. *The value of the Argument is,* that it assures us of the existence of a personal Being, who rules us in righteousness, and who is the proper object of supreme affection and service. But whether this Being is the original creator of all things, or merely the author of our own existence, whether he is infinite or finite, whether he is a Being of simple righteousness or also of mercy, this argument cannot assure us.

Among the arguments for the existence of God, however, we assign to this the chief place, since it adds to the ideas of causative power (which we derived from the Cosmological Argument) and of contriving intelligence (which we derived from the Teleological Argument), the far wider ideas of personality and righteous lordship.

Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Works of Reid*, 2: 974, note U; *Lect. on Metaph.*, 1: 83—"The only valid arguments for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul rest upon the ground of man's moral nature"; "theology is wholly dependent upon psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity." But Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 244, very properly objects to making this argument from the nature of man the sole proof of Deity: "It should be rather used to show the attributes of the Being whose existence has been already proved from other sources"; "hence the Anthropological Argument is as dependent upon the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments as they are upon it."

Yet the Anthropological Argument is needed to supplement the conclusions of the two others. Those who, like Herbert Spencer, recognize an infinite and absolute Being. Power and Cause, may yet fail to recognize this being as spiritual and personal, simply because they do not recognize themselves as spiritual and personal beings, that is, do not recognize reason, conscience, and free-will in man. Agnosticism in philosophy involves agnosticism in religion. See Flint, *Theism*, 68; Mill, *Criticism of Hamilton*, 2: 286; Dove, *Logic of Christian Faith*, 211-236, 261-299; Cooke, *Religion and Chemistry*: "God is love; but nature could not prove it, and the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world in order to attest it."

It is very common at this place to treat of what are called the Historical and the Biblical Arguments for the existence of God—the former arguing, from the unity of history, the latter arguing, from the unity of the Bible, that this unity must in each case have for its cause and explanation the existence of God. It is a sufficient reason for not discussing these arguments, that, without a previous belief in the existence of God, no one will see unity either in history or in the Bible.

#### IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR ARGUMENT FROM OUR ABSTRACT AND NECESSARY IDEAS.

This argument infers the existence of God from the abstract and necessary ideas of the human mind. It has three forms:

1. That of Samuel Clarke. Space and time are attributes of substance or being. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There must therefore be an infinite and eternal substance or Being to whom these attributes belong.

Gillespie states the argument somewhat differently. Space and time are modes of existence. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There must therefore be an infinite and eternal Being who subsists in these modes. But we reply :

Space and time are neither attributes of substance nor modes of existence. The argument, if valid, would prove that God is not mind but matter, for that could not be mind, but only matter, of which space and time were either attributes or modes.

The Ontological Argument is frequently called the *a priori* argument, that is, the argument from that which is logically prior, or earlier than experience, viz. our intuitive ideas. All the forms of the Ontological Argument are in this sense *a priori*. Space and time are *a priori* ideas. See Samuel Clarke, Works, 2: 521; Gillespie, Necessary Existence of God. *Per contra*, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 304; Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 226—"To begin, as Clarke did, with the proposition that 'something has existed from eternity,' is virtually to propose an argument after having assumed what is to be proved. Gillespie's form of the *a priori* argument, starting with the proposition 'infinity of extension is necessarily existing,' is liable to the same objection, with the additional disadvantage of attributing a property of matter to the Deity."

H. B. Smith says that Brougham misrepresented Clarke: "Clarke's argument is in his sixth proposition, and supposes the existence proved in what goes before. He aims here to establish the infinitude and omnipresence of this First Being. He does not prove existence from immensity." But we reply, neither can he prove the infinity of God from the immensity of space. Space and time are neither substances nor attributes, but are rather relations; see Calderwood, Philos. of Infinite, 331-335; Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, 66-96. The doctrine that space and time are attributes or modes of God's existence tends to a materialistic pantheism like that of Spinoza, who held that "the one and simple substance" (*substantia una et unica*) is known to us through the two attributes of thought and extension; mind = God in the mode of thought; matter = God in the mode of extension. Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 127, says well that an extended God is a material God; "space and time are attributes neither of matter nor mind;" "we must carry the moral idea into the natural world, not the natural idea into the moral world." See also, Blunt, Dictionary Doct. and Hist. Theol., 740; Porter, Human Intellect, 567.

2. That of Descartes. We have the idea of an infinite and perfect Being. This idea cannot be derived from imperfect and finite things. There must therefore be an infinite and perfect Being who is its cause.

But we reply that this argument confounds the idea of the infinite with an infinite idea. Man's idea of the infinite is not infinite but finite, and from a finite effect we cannot argue an infinite cause.

This form of the Ontological Argument, while it is *a priori*, as based upon a necessary idea of the human mind, is, unlike the other forms of the same argument, *a posteriori*, as arguing from this idea, as an effect, to the existence of a Being who is its cause. A *posteriori* argument = from that which is later to that which is earlier, that is, from effect to cause. The Cosmological, Teleological, and Anthropological Arguments are arguments *a posteriori*. Of this sort is the argument of Descartes; see Descartes, Meditation 3: "Haec idea quae in nobis est requirit Deum pro causa; Deusque proinde existit." The idea in men's minds is the impression of the workman's name stamped indelibly on his work—the shadow cast upon the human soul by that unseen One of whose being and presence it dimly informs us. Blunt, Dict. of Theol., 739; Saisset, Pantheism, 1: 54—"Descartes sets out from a fact of consciousness, while Anselm sets out from an abstract conception;" "Descartes's argument might be considered a branch of the Anthropological or Moral Argument, but for the fact that this last proceeds from man's constitution rather than from his abstract ideas." See Bib. Sac., 1849: 637.

3. That of Anselm. We have the idea of an absolutely perfect Being. But existence is an attribute of perfection. An absolutely perfect Being must therefore exist.

But we reply that this argument confounds ideal existence with real existence. Our ideas are not the measure of external reality.

Anselm, *Proslogion*, 2—*Id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo.* See translation of the *Proslogion*, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1851: 529, 699; Kant, *Critique*, 368. The arguments of Descartes and Anselm, with Kant's reply, are given in their original form by Harris, in *Journ. Spec. Philos.*, 15: 420-428. The major premise here is not that all perfect ideas imply the existence of the object which they represent, for then, as Kant objects, I might argue from my perfect idea of a \$100 bill that I actually possessed the same, which would be far from the fact. So I have a perfect idea of a perfectly evil being, of a centaur, of nothing—but it does not follow that the evil being, that the centaur, that nothing, exists. The argument is rather from the idea of absolute and perfect Being—of "that, no greater than which can be conceived." There can be but one such Being, and there can be but one such idea.

Yet even thus understood, we cannot argue from the idea to the actual existence of such a being. "Anselm's argument implies," says Fisher, in *Journ. Christ. Philos.*, Jan., 1883: 114, "that existence *in re* is a constituent of the concept. It would conclude the existence of a being from the definition of a word. This inference is justified only on the basis of philosophical realism." Dove, *Logic of the Christ. Faith*, 141—"The Ontological Argument is the algebraic formula of the universe, which leads to a valid conclusion with regard to real existence, only when we fill it in with the objects with which we become acquainted in the arguments *a posteriori*." See also, Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 231, and in *Presb. Rev.*, April, 1884: 212-227 (favoring the argument); Fisher, *Essays*, 574; Thompson, *Christian Theism*, 171; H. B. Smith, *Introd. to Christ. Theol.*, 122; Pfleiderer, *Die Religion*, 1: 181-187; *Studien und Kritiken*, 1875: 611-655.

Dörner, in his *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 197, gives us the best statement of the Ontological Argument: "Reason thinks of God as existing. Reason would not be reason, if it did not think of God as existing. Reason only is, upon the assumption that God is." But this is evidently not argument, but only vivid statement of the necessary assumption of the existence of an absolute Reason which conditions and gives validity to ours.

Although this last must be considered the most perfect form of the ontological argument, it is evident that it conducts us only to an ideal conclusion, not to real existence. In common with the two preceding forms of the argument, moreover, it tacitly assumes, as already existing in the human mind, that very knowledge of God's existence which it would derive from logical demonstration. It has value, therefore, simply as showing what God must be, if he exists at all.

But the existence of a Being indefinitely great, a personal Cause, Con-triver and Lawgiver, has been proved by the preceding arguments; for the law of parsimony requires us to apply the conclusions of the first three arguments to one Being, and not to many. To this one Being we may now ascribe the infinity and perfection, the idea of which lies at the basis of the Ontological Argument—ascibe them, not because they are demonstrably his, but because our mental constitution will not allow us to think otherwise. Thus clothing him with all perfections which the human mind can conceive, and these in illimitable fulness, we have one whom we may justly call God.

McCosh, *Div. Gov't*, 12, note—"It is at this place, if we do not mistake, that the idea of the Infinite comes in. The capacity of the human mind to form such an idea, or rather its intuitive belief in an Infinite of which it feels that it cannot form an adequate conception, may be no proof (as Kant maintains) of the existence of an infinite Being; but it is, we are convinced, the means by which the mind is enabled to invest the Deity, shown on other grounds to exist, with the attributes of infinity, *i. e.*, to look on his being, power, goodness, and all his perfections, as infinite." Even Flint, *Theism*, 68, who holds that we reach the existence of God by inference, speaks of "necessary conditions of thought and feeling, and ineradicable aspirations, which force on us ideas of absolute existence, infinity, and perfection, and will neither permit us to deny these perfections

to God, nor to ascribe them to any other being." Belief in God is not the conclusion of a demonstration, but the solution of a problem. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 226—"either the whole question is assumed in starting, or the Infinite is not reached in concluding."

As a logical process this is indeed defective, since all logic as well as all observation depends for its validity upon the presupposed existence of God, and since this particular process, even granting the validity of logic in general, does not warrant the conclusion that God exists, except upon a second assumption that our abstract ideas of infinity and perfection are to be applied to the Being to whom argument has actually conducted us.

But although both ends of the logical bridge are confessedly wanting, the process may serve and does serve a more useful purpose than that of mere demonstration, namely, that of awakening, explicating, and confirming a conviction which, though the most fundamental of all, may yet have been partially slumbering for lack of thought.

Morell, *Philos. Fragments*, 177, 179—"We can, in fact, no more prove the existence of a God by a logical argument, than we can prove the existence of an external world; but none the less may we obtain as strong a *practical* conviction of the one, as the other." "We arrive at a scientific belief in the existence of God just as we do at any other possible human truth. We *assume* it, as a hypothesis absolutely necessary to account for the phenomena of the universe; and then evidences from every quarter begin to converge upon it, until, in process of time, the common sense of mankind, cultivated and enlightened by ever accumulating knowledge, pronounces upon the validity of the hypothesis with a voice scarcely less decided and universal than it does in the case of our highest scientific convictions."

Fisher, *Essays on Supernat. Orig. of Christ'y*, 572—"What then is the purport and force of the several arguments for the existence of God? We reply that these proofs are the different modes in which faith expresses itself and seeks confirmation. In them faith, or the object of faith, is more exactly conceived and defined, and in them is found a corroboration, not arbitrary but substantial and valuable, of that faith which springs from the soul itself. Such proofs, therefore, are neither on the one hand sufficient to create and sustain faith, nor are they on the other hand to be set aside as of no value." A. J. Barrett: "The arguments are not so much a bridge in themselves, as they are guys, to hold firm the great suspension-bridge of intuition, by which we pass the gulf from man to God. Or, while they are not a ladder by which we may reach heaven, they are the Ossa on Pellion, from whose combined height we may descry heaven." On the whole subject, see Cudworth, *Intel. System of the Universe*, 3: 42; Calderwood, *Philos. of the Infinite*, 150 *sq.*; Curtis, *Human Element in Inspiration*, 242; Peabody, in *Andover Review*, July, 1884; Hahn, *History of the Arguments for the Existence of God*.

## CHAPTER III.

### ERRONEOUS EXPLANATIONS OF THE FACTS.

Any correct explanation of the universe must postulate an intuitive knowledge of the existence of the external world, of self, and of God. The desire for scientific unity, however, has induced attempts to reduce these three factors to one, and according as one or another of the three has been regarded as the all-inclusive principle, the result has been Materialism, Idealism, or Pantheism.

#### I. MATERIALISM.

Materialism is that method of thought which gives priority to matter, rather than to mind, in its explanations of the universe. Upon this view, material atoms constitute the ultimate and fundamental reality of which all things, rational and irrational, are but combinations and phenomena. Force is regarded as a universal and inseparable property of matter.

The element of truth in materialism is the reality of second causes. Its error is in mistaking these second causes for first causes, and in supposing them able to account for their own existence, and for the existence of the universe.

Herschel says that these atoms, in recognizing each other in order to combine, show a great deal of 'presence of mind.' The monad of Leibnitz = 'parvus in suo genere deus.' Deprive matter of force (impenetrability, motion, etc.), and you have only extension left. This makes matter = space = zero. The impossibility of finding in matter, regarded as mere atoms, any of the attributes of a cause, has led to a general abandonment of this old Materialism of Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Condillac, Holbach, Feuerbach, Büchner; and Materialistic Idealism has taken its place, which instead of regarding force as a property of matter, regards matter as a manifestation of force. See Lange, *History of Materialism*; Janet, *Materialism*; Fabri, *Materialismus*; Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, art.: *Materialismus*; but esp., Stallo, *Modern Physics*, 149-170.

In addition to the general error indicated above, we object to this system as follows:

1. In knowing matter, the mind necessarily judges itself to be a substance different in kind, and higher in rank, than the matter which it knows.

We here state simply an intuitive conviction. The mind, in using its physical organism and through it bringing external nature into its service, recognizes itself as different from and superior to matter. Martineau, quoted in *Brit. Quar.*, April, 1882: 173—"The inorganic and unconscious portion of the world, instead of being the potentiality of the organic and conscious, is rather its residual precipitate, formed as the indwelling Mind concentrates an intenser aim on the upper margin of the ordered whole, and especially on the inner life of the natures that can resemble him." Pres. Thos. Hill, in *Brit. Sec.*, April, 1852: 353—"All that is really given by the act of sense-perception is the existence of the conscious self, floating in boundless space and boundless time, surrounded and sustained by boundless power. The material world, which we at first think the great reality, is only the shadow of a real being, which is immaterial." Harris,

Philosophical Basis of Theism, 317—"Imagine an infinitesimal being in the brain, watching the action of the molecules, but missing the thought. So science observes the universe, and misses God."

2. Since the mind's attributes of (a) continuous identity, (b) self-activity, (c) unrelatedness to space, are different in kind and higher in rank than the attributes of matter, it is rational to conclude that the substance underlying mental phenomena is a substance different in kind and higher in rank than that which underlies material phenomena.

This is an argument from specific qualities to the nature of the substance underlying them. (a) Memory proves personal identity. This is not an identity of material atoms, for atoms change. The molecules that come cannot remember those that depart. Some immutable part in the brain? organized, or unorganized? organized decays; unorganized = soul. (b) Inertia shows that matter is not self-moving. It acts only as it is acted upon. A single atom would never move. Two portions are necessary, and these, in order to useful action, require adjustment by a power which does not belong to matter. Evolution of the universe inexplicable, unless matter were first moved by some power outside itself. See Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 92. (c) The highest activities of mind are independent of known physical conditions. Mind controls and subdues the body. It does not cease to grow when the growth of the body ceases. When the body nears dissolution, the mind often asserts itself most strikingly.

See Porter, *Human Intellect*, 22, 131, 132. McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism*, chap. on Materialism; *Divine Government*, 71-94; *Intuitions*, 140-145. Hopkins, *Study of Man*, 53-56; Morell, *Hist. Philos.*, 318-334; Hickok, *Rational Cosmology*, 403; *Theol. Eclectic*, 6: 555; Appleton, *Works*, 1: 151-154; Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 235; Ulrich, *Leib und Seele*, 688-725, and synopsis, in *Bap. Quar.*, July, 1873: 380.

3. This common judgment that mind and matter are distinct substances must be regarded as conclusive, until it is scientifically demonstrated that mind is material in its origin and nature. But all attempts to explain the psychical from the physical, or the organic from the inorganic, are acknowledged failures. The most that can be claimed is, that psychical are always accompanied by physical changes, and that the inorganic is the basis and support of the organic. Although the precise connection between the mind and the body is unknown, the fact that the continuity of physical changes is unbroken in times of psychical activity renders it certain that mind is not transformed physical force.

The chemist can produce *organic*, but not *organized*, substances. The *life* cannot be produced from matter. Even in living things progress is secured only by plan. Multiplication of desired advantage, in the Darwinian scheme, requires a selecting thought; in other words the natural selection is artificial selection after all. John Fiske, *Destiny of the Creature*, 109—"Cerebral physiology tells us that, during the present life, although thought and feeling are always manifested in connection with a peculiar form of matter, yet by no possibility can thought and feeling be in any sense the product of matter. Nothing could be more grossly unscientific than the famous remark of Cabanis, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. It is not even correct to say that thought goes on in the brain. What goes on the brain is an amazingly complex series of molecular movements, with which thought and feeling are in some unknown way correlated, not as effects or as causes, but as concomitants."

Leibnitz's "pre-established harmony" indicates the difficulty of defining the relation between mind and matter. See *British Quarterly*, Jan., 1874: art. by Herbert, on Mind and the Science of Energy; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, sec. 56: "Two things, mind and nervous action, exist together, but we cannot imagine how they are related." See Review of Spencer's *Psychology*, in *N. Englander*, July, 1873. Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, 120—"The passage from the physics of the brain to the facts of consciousness is unthinkable." Bain, *Mind and Body*, 131: No break in physical continuity. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 145; Talbot, in *Bap. Quarterly*, Jan., 1871: 1.



4. The materialistic theory, denying as it does the priority of spirit, can furnish no sufficient cause for the highest features of the existing universe, namely, its personal intelligences, its intuitive ideas, its moral progress, its beliefs in God and immortality.

Herbert, *Modern Realism Examined*: "Materialism has no physical evidence of the existence of consciousness in others. As it declares our fellow-men to be destitute of free volition, so it should declare them destitute of consciousness; should call them, as well as brutes, pure automata. If physics are all, there is no God, but there is also no man existing." Some of the early followers of Descartes used to kick and beat their dogs, laughing meanwhile at their cries and calling them the "creaking of the machine." Huxley, who calls the brutes "conscious automata," believes in the gradual banishment, from all regions of human thought, of what we call spirit and spontaneity: "A spontaneous act is an absurdity; it is simply an effect that is uncaused."

Dinan, *Theistic Argument*, 348—"Materialism can never explain the fact that matter is always combined with force. Coördinate principles? then dualism, instead of monism. Force cause of matter? then we preserve unity, but destroy materialism; for we trace matter to an immaterial source. Behind multiplicity of natural forces we must postulate some single power—which can be nothing but coördinating mind." Mark Hopkins sums up Materialism in *Princeton Rev.*, Nov., 1879: 490—"1. Man, who is a person, is made by a thing, *i. e.* matter. 2. Matter is to be worshipped as man's maker, if anything is to be (*Rom. 1: 25*). 3. Man is to worship himself—his God is his belly." See also Martineau, *Religion and Materialism*, 25-31; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, 145-161; Buchanan, *Modern Atheism*, 247, 248; McCosh, in *International Rev.*, Jan., 1875; *Contemp. Rev.*, Jan., 1875, art.: *Man Transcorporeal*; Calderwood, *Relations of Mind and Brain*; Laycock, *Mind and Brain*; Dinan, *Theistic Argument*, 358; Wilkinson, in *Present Day Tracts*, 3: no. 17.

## II. MATERIALISTIC IDEALISM.

Idealism proper is that method of thought which regards all knowledge as conversant only with affections of the percipient mind.

Its element of truth is the fact that these affections of the percipient mind are the conditions of our knowledge. Its error is in denying that through these and in these we know that which exists independently of our consciousness.

The idealism of the present day is mainly a materialistic idealism. It defines matter and mind alike in terms of sensation, and regards both as opposite sides or successive manifestations of one underlying and unknowable force.

Modern idealism is the development of a principle found as far back as Locke. Locke derived all our knowledge from sensation. Berkeley said that externally we could be sure only of sensations—could not therefore be sure that the external world exists at all. Hume carried the principle further and held that internally also we cannot be sure of anything but mental phenomena. We do not know mental substance within, any more than we know material substance without. Berkeley's view is to be found in his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 18 sq. See also *Presb. Rev.*, April, 1885: 301-313; *Journ. Spec. Philos.*, 1884: 246-260, 333-369; Tulloch, *Mod. Theories*, 360, 361.

The most complete refutation of idealism in all its forms, is that of Sir Wm. Hamilton, in his *Metaphysics*, 348-372, and *Theories of Sense-Perception—the Reply to Brown*. See condensed statement of Hamilton's view, with estimate and criticism, in Porter, *Human Intellect*, 236-240; on Idealism, see also 129, 132. Porter holds that original perception gives us simply affections of our own sensorium; as cause of these, we gain knowledge of extended externality. So Sir Wm. Hamilton: "Sensation proper has no object but a subject-object." But both Porter and Hamilton hold that through these sensations we know that which exists independently of our sensations.

Mill, however, in his *Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton*, 1: 234-253, makes sensations the only objects of knowledge; defines matter as a "permanent possibility of sensu-

tion" and mind as a "series of feelings aware of itself." So Huxley calls matter "only a name for the unknown cause of states of consciousness." Mill and Huxley, with Spencer, Bain, and Tyndall, are Humists. See Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, 1: 75; 2: 80. All these regard the material atom as a mere centre of force = hypothetical cause of sensations. Matter is therefore a manifestation of force, while, to the old materialism, force was a property of matter. See art. on Huxley, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Oct., 1872; Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, 73. But if matter, mind, and God are nothing but sensations, then the body itself is nothing but sensations. There is no *body*, to have the sensations, and no *spirit*, either human or divine, to produce them. See Lowndes, *Philos. of Primary Beliefs*, 115-143; Atwater (on Ferrier), in *Princeton Rev.*, 1857: 258-280.

To this view we make the following objections:

1. Its definition of matter as a "permanent possibility of sensation" contradicts our intuitive judgment that, in knowing the phenomena of matter, we have direct knowledge of substance as underlying phenomena, as distinct from our sensations, and as external to the mind which experiences these sensations.

Bowne, *Metaphysics*, 432—"How the possibility of an odor and a flavor can be the cause of the yellow color of an orange is probably unknowable, except to a mind that can see that two and two may make five." See Inverach's *Philosophy of Spencer Examined*, in *Present Day Tracts*, 5: no. 29.

2. Its definition of mind as a "series of sensations aware of itself" contradicts our intuitive judgment that, in knowing the phenomena of mind, we have direct knowledge of a spiritual substance of which these phenomena are manifestations, which retains its identity independently of our consciousness, and which, in its knowing, instead of being the passive recipient of impressions from without, always acts from within by a power of its own.

See, on Bain's *Cerebral Psychology*, Martineau's *Essays*, 1: 265. On the physiological method of mental philosophy, see Talbot, in *Bap. Quar.*, 1871: 1; Bowen, on Dualism, Materialism, or Idealism, in *Princeton Rev.*, March, 1878: 423-450.

3. In so far as this theory regards mind as the obverse side of matter, or as a later and higher development from matter, the mere reference of both mind and matter to an underlying force does not save the theory from any of the difficulties of pure materialism already mentioned; since in this case, equally with that, force is regarded as purely physical, and the priority of spirit is denied.

Herbert Spencer, *Psychology*, quoted by Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, 2: 80—"Mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing. Yet we remain utterly incapable of seeing, or even of imagining, how the two are related. Mind still continues to us a something without kinship to other things." Owen, *Anatomy of Vertebrates*, quoted by Talbot, *Bap. Quar.*, Jan., 1871: 5—"All that I know of matter and mind in themselves is that the former is an external centre of force, and the latter an internal centre of force." *New Englander*, Sept., 1883: 636—"If the atom be a mere centre of force and not a real thing in itself, then the atom is a supersensual essence, an immaterial being. To make immaterial matter the source of conscious mind is to make matter as wonderful as an immortal soul or a personal Creator." See *New Englander*, July, 1875: 532-535; Martineau, *Religion and Modern Materialism*, 25—"If it takes mind to construe the universe, how can the negation of mind constitute it?"

4. In so far as this theory holds the underlying force of which matter and mind are manifestations to be in any sense intelligent or voluntary, it leads to the conclusion that second causes, whether material or spiritual, have no proper existence, and that there is but one agent in the universe—a conclusion which involves all the difficulties of pantheism.

Some recent Christian thinkers, as Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 13-15, 29-36, 42-52, would define mind as a function of matter, matter as a function of force, force as a function of will, and therefore as the power of an omnipresent and personal God. All force, except that of man's free will, is the will of God. So Herschell, *Lectures*, 460; Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 121-127; Wallace on Nat. Selection, 363-371; Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 63, 121, 145, 265; Bowne, *Metaph. and Ethics*, 146-162. But if man's will exhibits a force distinguishable from the divine, why may there not be physical forces distinguishable from the divine? If God can disengage from himself the force displayed in living human beings, then he can disengage from himself the force displayed in inanimate nature. The same reasoning which assures us of the existence of the former assures us of the existence of the latter.

To deny second causes is essential idealism, and tends to pantheism. This tendency we find in the recent *Metaphysics* of Bowne, who regards only personality as real. Matter is phenomenal, although it is an activity of the divine will outside of us. Bowne's phenomenalism is therefore an objective idealism, as distinguished from the subjective idealism of Berkeley, who held to God's energizing only within the soul. But since, according to Bowne, space is only a form of our thinking, the difference between God's ceaseless production of phenomena within, and God's ceaseless production of phenomena without, is purely verbal. Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, makes man's consciousness a part or aspect of a universal consciousness, and so, instead of making God come to consciousness only in man, as Hegel did, makes man come to consciousness only in God. While this scheme seems, in one view, to save God's personality, it practically identifies man's personality with God's, which is subjective pantheism. On the substantive existence of second causes, see Porter, *Human Intellect*, 582-588; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 506; Alden, *Philosophy*, 48-70; Hodgson, *Time and Space*, 149-218.

### III. PANTHEISM.

Pantheism is that method of thought which conceives of the universe as the development of one intelligent and voluntary, yet impersonal, substance, which reaches consciousness only in man. It therefore identifies God, not with each individual object in the universe, but with the totality of things.

The elements of truth in pantheism are the intelligence and voluntariness of God, and his immanence in the universe; its error lies in denying God's personality and transcendence.

Pantheism denies the real existence of the finite, at the same time that it deprives the Infinite of self-consciousness and freedom. See Hunt, *History of Pantheism*; Manning, *Half-truths and the Truth*; Bayne, *Christian Life, Social and Individual*, 21-53; Hutton, on *Popular Pantheism*, in *Essays*, 1: 55-76—"The pantheist's 'I believe in God,' is a contradiction. He says: 'I perceive the external as different from myself; but on further reflection, I perceive that this external was itself the percipient agency.' So the worshipped is really the worshipper after all." Harris, *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, 173—"Man is a bottle of the ocean's water, in the ocean, temporarily distinguishable by its limitation within the bottle, but lost again in the ocean, so soon as these fragile limits are broken."

The later Brahmanism is pantheistic. Rowland Williams, *Christianity and Hinduism*, quoted in Mozley on *Miracles*, 284—"In the final state personality vanishes. You will not, says the Brahman, accept the term 'void' as an adequate description of the mysterious nature of the soul, but you will clearly apprehend soul, in the final state, to be unseen and ungrasped being, thought, knowledge, joy—no other than very God." Yet this seems to be only the later depravation of an earlier and purer faith. In the *London Spectator*, Rhys Davids tells us that "In the Pali Suttas, the earliest Buddhist records, the Buddhist New Testament indeed, *Nirvana* is only death in the sense of death to trespasses and sins; it is always the extinction of *Schnucht*, excitement, in its three forms of lust, malice, and delusion. It is the extinction of selfishness or love of individuality, and is to be reached here on earth." Flint, *Theism*, 60—"Where the will is without energy, and rest is longed for as the end of existence, as among the Hindus, there is marked inability to think of God as cause or will, and constant inveterate tendency to pantheism."

We object to this system as follows:

1. Its idea of God is self-contradictory, since it makes him infinite, yet consisting only of the finite; absolute, yet existing in necessary relation to the universe; supreme, yet shut up to a process of self-evolution and dependent for self-consciousness on man; without self-determination, yet the cause of all that is.

Saisset, Pantheism, 148—"An imperfect God, yet perfection arising from imperfection." Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 1: 13—"Pantheism applies to God a principle of growth and imperfection, which belongs only to the finite." Calderwood, Moral Philos., 245—"Its first requisite is moment, or movement, which it assumes, but does not account for." Caro's sarcasm applies here: "Your God is not yet made—he is in process of manufacture." See H. B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 25.

2. Its assumed unity of substance is not only without proof, but it directly contradicts our intuitive judgments. These testify that we are not parts and particles of God, but distinct personal substances.

Martineau, Essays, 1: 158—"Even for immanency, there must be something wherein to dwell, and for life, something whereon to act." Any system of monism contradicts consciousness. "In scripture we never find the universe called τὸ πᾶν, for this suggests the idea of a self-contained unity: we have everywhere τὰ πάντα instead." The Bible recognizes the element of truth in pantheism—God is 'through all'; also the element of truth in mysticism—God is 'in you all'; but it adds the element of transcendence which both these fail to recognize—God is 'above all' (Eph. 4: 6). See Fisher, Essays on Supernat. Orig. of Christ'y, 539.

3. It assigns no sufficient cause for that fact of the universe which is highest in rank, and therefore most needs explanation, namely, the existence of personal intelligences. A substance which is itself unconscious, and under the law of necessity, cannot produce beings who are self-conscious and free.

Geas, Foundations of our Faith, 36—"Animal instinct, and the spirit of a nation working out its language, might furnish analogies, if they produced personalities as their result, but not otherwise. Nor were these tendencies self-originated, but received from an external source." McCosh, Intuitions, 215, 303; Christianity and Positivism, 180.

4. It therefore contradicts the affirmations of our moral and religious natures by denying man's freedom and responsibility; by making God to include in himself all evil as well as all good; and by precluding all prayer, worship, and hope of immortality.

Conscience is the eternal witness against pantheism. Conscience witnesses to our freedom and responsibility, and declares that moral distinctions are not illusory. Renouf, Hibbert Lect., 234—"It is only out of condescension to popular language that pantheistic systems can recognize the notions of right and wrong, of iniquity and sin. If everything really emanates from God, there can be no such thing as sin. And the ablest philosophers who have been led to pantheistic views, have vainly endeavored to harmonize these views with what we understand by the notion of sin or moral evil. The great systematic work of Spinoza is entitled 'Ethica'; but for real ethics we might as profitably consult the Elements of Euclid." Hodge, System. Theology, 1: 299-330—"Pantheism is fatalistic. On this theory, duty = pleasure; right = might; sin = good in the making. Satan, as well as Gabriel, is a self-development of God. The practical effects of pantheism upon popular morals and life, wherever it has prevailed, as in Buddhist India and China, demonstrate its falsehood." See also Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 118; Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 202; Bib. Sac., Oct., 1867: 603-615; Dix, Pantheism, Introd., 12.

5. Our intuitive conviction of the existence of a God of absolute perfection compels us to conceive of God as possessed of every highest quality

and attribute of men, and therefore, especially, of that which constitutes the chief dignity of the human spirit, its personality.

Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 328—"We have no right to represent the supreme Cause as inferior to ourselves, yet we do this when we describe it under phrases derived from physical causation." Mivart, *Lessons from Nature*, 351—"We cannot conceive of anything as impersonal, yet of higher nature than our own—any being that has not knowledge and will must be indefinitely inferior to one who has them."

6. Its objection to the divine personality, that over against the Infinite there can be in eternity past no non-ego to call forth self-consciousness, is refuted by considering that even man's cognition of the non-ego logically presupposes knowledge of the ego, from which the non-ego is distinguished; that, in an absolute mind, self-consciousness cannot be conditioned, as in the case of finite mind, upon contact with a not-self; and that, if the distinguishing of self from a not-self were an essential condition of divine self-consciousness, the eternal personal distinctions in the divine nature might furnish such a condition.

Pfeiderer, *Die Religion*, 1: 190 sq.—"Before the soul distinguishes self from the not-self, it must know self—else it could not see the distinction. Its development is connected with the knowledge of the non-ego, but this is due, not to the fact of *personality*, but to the fact of *finite* personality. The mature man can live for a long time upon his own resources. God needs no other, to stir him up to mental activity. Finiteness is a hindrance to the development of our personality. Infiniteness is necessary to the highest personality." Lotze, *Microcosmos*, vol. 3, chapter 4; transl. in *N. Eng.*, March, 1881: 191-200—"Finite spirit, not having conditions of existence in itself, can know the ego only upon occasion of knowing the non-ego. The Infinite is not so limited. He alone has an independent existence, neither introduced nor developed through anything not himself, but, in an inward activity without beginning or end, maintains himself in himself."

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*: "Absolute Personality = perfect consciousness of self, and perfect power over self. We need something external to waken our consciousness—yet self-consciousness comes [logically] before consciousness of the world. It is the soul's act. Only after it has distinguished self from self, can it consciously distinguish self from another." *British Quarterly*, Jan., 1874: 32, note; July, 1884: 108—"The ego is *thinkable* only in relation to the non-ego; but the ego is *liveable* long before any such relation." See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2: 122-128; Christlieb, *Mod. Doubt and Christ. Belief*, 161-190; Hanne, *Idee der absoluten Persönlichkeit*; Eichhorn, *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes*.